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[NOT] BUYING IT: PROSTITUTION AS UNWANTED SEX 
Rebecca Whisnant 
University of Dayton 
ABSTRACT 
Noting the relative invisibility of prostitution buyers, or Johns, in discussions of the 
morality of prostitution, this article criticizes Johns’ behavior on the grounds that they are 
culpably involved in causing the typical harms of prostitution in the lives of the women 
whom they pay for sex. Those harms are, at bottom, the result of being habitually subjected 
to unwanted sex, and they are exacerbated rather than mitigated by such sex being bought 
and paid for. Efforts to normalize and legalize sex-buying should therefore be resisted.  
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ROSITUTION IS A MULTI-BILLION-DOLLAR INDUSTRY, in which mostly men 
purchase sexual access to, and sexual activity with, other persons—predom-
inantly women and girls. For some men, this is a routine practice, while oth-
ers do it only on rare occasions. Some men pick up women on the street; others 
visit legal or illegal brothels, and still others hire high-priced escorts. These varia-
tions should not obscure the fact that the purchasing behavior itself is remarkably 
common and consistent, cutting across standard political, religious, ethnic, and 
national lines among men (Monto 2004).1  
Discussions of the morality of prostitution too often focus primarily if not ex-
clusively on the woman’s morality (or lack thereof). The male buyer is rendered 
invisible, and his choices are thus shielded from moral criticism.2 When his behav-
ior is noticed or remarked upon, it is often assumed to be, if not morally ideal, at 
least natural: boys will be boys, after all, and they have their needs.3 The prostitu-
tion buyer is “everyman,” or so we are told. Not surprisingly, given the attitudes 
_______________________________ 
1 While Monto emphasizes that it is a minority of men who buy sex from women in prostitution, he 
also makes clear that customers “come from diverse backgrounds, participate in a range of sexual 
activities, and have a wide variety of motivations for seeking out prostitutes” (2004, p. 165). 
2 There are some welcome exceptions in recent years to the invisibility of the male buyer; see, for 
instance, Monto 2004 and Coy et. al. 2012. 
3 An exclusive focus on the female sellers, rather than the male buyers, has also characterized many 
efforts to explain the incidence and prevalence of prostitution. Sheila Jeffreys (1997, p. 214) explains 
that “One basic assumption of pro-prostitution ideology is that johns are just doing what comes nat-
P 
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just mentioned, he typically sees his own behavior as morally innocuous (Malarek 
2009). Let’s call him—what else?—John.4  
Even feminist philosophical work criticizing industries of sexual exploitation 
tends to be silent on the specific culpability of Johns (Gauthier 2011, Brison 2006). 
Perhaps this is because such work has often focused broadly on prostitution’s 
damaging social and ideological implications; as Jeffrey Gauthier observes, 
“feminist criticisms of prostitution have focused on the ways in which the current 
practice reinforces sexist beliefs about women, and thereby contributes to women’s 
subordination” (2011, p. 174).  
While I share many of those criticisms, in this paper I focus primarily on the 
harms to women involved in prostitution, and thus on some of those who are most 
directly responsible for causing those harms: the men who buy their services. In 
this way, my approach mirrors and amplifies the increasing focus in public debates 
over prostitution on challenging and/or ending demand—that is, on diminishing 
the harms of prostitution by targeting those who are buying, rather than those who 
are selling. The most prominent approach here is the so-called “Nordic model” of 
legislation, which decriminalizes those who sell sex (and supports them in exiting 
the trade) while criminalizing pimps and buyers. As the Nordic model continues to 
gain traction in Europe, it is important to underwrite the approach by articulating 
a clear moral critique of Johns’ behavior. While such a critique will not suffice 
alone to legitimize the Nordic legal approach, to which many empirical and ethical 
questions are relevant, it would be hard to support that approach absent any moral 
critique of Johns: if they are not doing anything wrong, then why should their be-
havior be criminalized? 
I have few illusions about my argument herein dissuading prostitution users 
from continuing to buy sex. Rather, my hope is to affect the judgments of others 
regarding sex-buying. As I hope to show, and in opposition to the protestations of 
many “sex work” supporters, we as a society should indeed stigmatize Johns—re-
sisting efforts to legalize and normalize their behavior, and counteracting their net-
works of mutual support and self-congratulation (Malarek, 2009).  
In its broadest outline, the argument herein is simple: what a John does is 
wrong because he is culpably involved in causing the typical harms of prostitution 
in the lives of the women whom he uses. Those harms are, at bottom, the result of 
being habitually subjected to paid, unwanted sex.  
As will soon become clear, by “unwanted” I do not mean “nonconsensual.” Cer-
tainly, many women in prostitution are not there consensually, and prostituted 
women are routinely raped both by customers and by others. While outrage at such 
slavery and overt abuse is appropriate, we should not allow it to eclipse the grave 
harms that I will claim are intrinsic to prostitution itself, including consensual 
_______________________________ 
urally, acting out biologically created, imperative urges in the bodies of prostituted women. Sexolo-
gists who have sought an explanation for prostitution have concentrated on the women, since it was 
the women who were seen as acting abnormally.”  
4 Jeffreys points out that the term ‘john’, invented by prostituted women themselves, is apt in that it 
conveys the anonymity and interchangeability of customers as the women encounter them. It cap-
tures the sense in which, from the women’s point of view, the buyers are ‘generic males, indistin-
guishable one from another’ (1997, p. 3).  
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prostitution. Those harms, I will argue, are largely the result of unwanted sex, and 
they are exacerbated rather than mitigated by such sex being bought and paid for.  
After a brief explanation of the distinction between wanting something and 
consenting to it, I will offer an account of what prostitution is like for the women 
doing it, and of its typical damaging effects on their bodies and psyches. I will 
contend that one important explanation for those effects is that the sex they are 
having is unwanted, and that this fact renders morally problematic the behavior of 
those who inflict the unwanted sex on them. I will then explain why the harms of 
unwanted sex—which certainly occur outside prostitution as well as within it—are 
made worse, not better, by the commercial context of prostitution and its associ-
ated norms. 
A few clarifications and caveats are called for before I begin the argument in 
earnest. First, although both women and men can and do prostitute, and there are 
some female Johns, I will focus here on what I take to be the paradigm case: 
namely, a man purchasing sexual service from a woman. Thus, hereafter, by “the 
man” I mean the buyer or John, and by “the woman” I mean the woman prostitu-
ting. 
Second, prostitution is a broad and complex set of practices, including not  only 
street, escort, and brothel prostitution but also stripping, phone sex, porno-
graphy, and more.5 Although I believe that my analysis, suitably modified, could 
shed light on significant moral features of these other types of prostitution, herein 
I will focus on prostitution that involves a direct, physical, sexual encounter be-
tween a seller and a buyer. To emphasize that prostitution is a condition or activity, 
not an identity or status, I do not refer to the woman as a prostitute, but rather as 
a prostituted (or prostituting) woman.  
Third, in this paper I focus on the morality of Johns’ behavior only insofar as it 
affects the prostituting woman; my interest is in whether he is wronging her, and 
if so, how. I will thus set aside the moral implications of Johns’ actions insofar as 
they affect other persons—for instance, his deception of or infidelity toward his 
wife or partner if he has one, the extent to which his behavior puts his other 
partners at risk for sexually transmitted diseases, and any effects of his use of 
prostituted women on his overall treatment of his female partner and/or of women 
in general.  
Fourth, for sellers prostitution is often accompanied and/or produced by a set 
of brutal and punishing background conditions (MacKinnon 2011). These condi-
tions may include desperate poverty, a violent or threatening pimp, drug addiction, 
and/or prior experiences of sexual abuse (especially in childhood). The general 
cultural awareness of these background conditions—an awareness often 
disturbingly reflected in jokes and mockery—is highly relevant to Johns’ level of 
moral blameworthiness, since in general we ought not to take advantage of people 
whom we have good reason to believe are unusually vulnerable and/or whose 
_______________________________ 
5 While different scholars and activists use the term “prostitution” differently, it is common among 
feminist abolitionists to use it in the relatively encompassing way that I indicate here. For analyses 
of pornography in particular as a form of prostitution, see Whisnant (2004) and Jensen (2004). 
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consent to do what we want them to do is, at best, questionable. In my view, how-
ever, the moral wrongness of Johns’ behavior does not depend either on such con-
ditions obtaining, or on his being specifically aware of them if they do obtain. I 
hope to show that what he does is wrong, even absent these exacerbating condi-
tions in the life of the particular woman to whom he does it.  
Consenting and Wanting 
The difference between consenting to do something and wanting to do it is fa-
miliar enough, in a rough and ready way. It is one thing for someone to take a phi-
losophy course because she is interested in learning philosophy; it is quite another 
thing for someone to take the course only to fulfill a graduation requirement. The 
latter consents to do something that he does not want to do, that he in fact may 
want very much not to do, because there is something he does want (a degree) to 
which taking the course is a necessary means.  
Sometimes one consents to do something that one simply has no independent 
or pre-existing desire to do. For instance, a friend or roommate asks one to ride 
along on a trip to the grocery store. Before being asked, one was indifferent to the 
prospect of going to the grocery store, and one still has no particular desire to go, 
but one consents—perhaps even cheerfully—to go anyway. On other occasions, one 
consents to do something that one actively desires not to do, that one finds repug-
nant, boring, or otherwise unpleasant: a noxious household chore, for instance, or 
a visit to a lonely but annoying relative. These brief examples should suffice to sug-
gest that there are many common and straightforward reasons for consenting to 
unwanted activities.  
A person’s sex act is unwanted in my sense when, as Clelia Anderson and 
Yolanda Estes put it, she “performs sexual acts for another without any interest in 
or desire for connection to that person, without any response to sexual needs of 
her own, or solely to accomplish some end extraneous to her sexual and emotional 
satisfaction” (1998, p. 153). The overwhelming majority, if not all, of the sex acts in 
prostitution are, in this sense, unwanted by the woman. They are acts that she per-
forms not because she wants to, but because there is something else that she does 
want, to which the sex acts are necessary means. As Catharine MacKinnon puts it, 
“When you are having sex with someone you want to be having sex with, you aren’t 
generally paying each other. Being one of those things money cannot buy, the real 
thing is neither bought nor sold” (2011, p. 281). The woman’s attitude toward the 
sex acts of prostitution may sometimes be simple disinterest, but often enough is 
more strongly negative; as prostitution survivor and activist Rachel Moran ob-
serves, “sexual revulsion is a daily experience in prostitution” (2013, p. 158).  
We should not be too quick to assume that the thing that the woman wants and 
anticipates getting, to which the sex is an unwanted but necessary means, is 
money. Obviously, it may be. But what she wants could also be a drug fix, or to 
avoid a beating, or to please her pimp and thus be assured of his continued “love” 
and/or protection, or to make a certain quota of customers tonight and thus be let 
back into the house by her pimp husband who commandeers and controls any 
money that she has made. So even when the immediate object is money, the 
woman’s desire or need for money—and for the ordinary goods of life that money 
can buy—may be far from the whole story. Missing this point may lead us to see 
women in prostitution as more mercenary in their motivations than many in fact 
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are, and to understate the degree of vulnerability and desperation that often un-
derlies their choices.  
To clarify, I do not believe that my argument in what follows requires the claim 
that all sex that is not mutually desired is thereby morally flawed. Ann Cahill criti-
cizes this view, pointing out that “a model of sexuality that assumes that desire 
precedes sexual engagement, or even arousal, may be distinctly masculinist” (2014, 
p. 310). Not only can desire emerge during (rather than initially motivating) a sex-
ual encounter, as Cahill observes, but in many ongoing relationships, there are oc-
casions when one partner has sex even though she lacks any particular occurrent 
(or even emergent) desire to do so. She has sex to please, comfort, and connect 
with her partner because she loves her partner; and her partner does the same on 
other occasions. (Note that such generosity would not count as unwanted sex on 
Anderson and Estes’ definition, since it is rooted in an emotional connection to the 
other person.) Rather, my argument trades on the likelihood that repeated and ha-
bitual unwanted sex, unleavened by a broader relational mutuality and taking 
place in the commercial context of prostitution, results in serious damage to the 
women having it.  
The Experience of Prostitution: Three Common Elements 
In what follows, I describe some key experiential elements that repeatedly arise 
both in first-person accounts and in research studies of women in prostitution. The 
three elements discussed here are especially worthy of attention because they ap-
pear to cut across many kinds, or contexts, of prostitution—forced and consensual, 
legal and illegal, pimp-controlled and not, street and brothel, and so on. The pres-
ence of these experiential elements across the board suggests that they are in some 
sense inherent to prostitution itself—rather than, for instance, mere byproducts of 
social stigma and/or illegality. Of the three elements, two are due (at least in sig-
nificant part) to the fact that the sex is unwanted, while the third is likely to exac-
erbate that very unwantedness. 
First, women in prostitution commonly report that, to tolerate the experience 
of prostituting, they have to find some way to dissociate psychologically and emo-
tionally from that experience as it is happening. Women describe this process in 
various ways. Some say that they “leave their bodies,” others that they just “shut 
down” or “go numb” and pretend not to be there. One woman reports that to get 
through turning a trick, you have to “make yourself empty inside” (Bishop and 
Robinson 1998). Many prostituted women—as many as seventy percent, according 
to one study—use legal or illegal drugs as a means of dissociation (Kramer 2003, 
p. 191).  
These dissociative strategies constitute strong prima facie evidence that the 
sex of prostitution is unwanted. Common sense suggests that one dissociates from 
something in one’s mind because one does not want that thing to be happening; 
these are modes of psychological escape from an unbearable reality. As Rachel Mo-
ran observes, “when a person needs to practise and perfect a state of mental lock-
down . . . in order to stand the sexual acts they are enduring, that person is being 
abused” (2013, p. 110). Indeed, it is striking the extent to which many women’s 
first-person accounts of prostitution, including of the dissociative mechanisms em-
ployed to endure it, resemble first-person accounts of rape (Brison 2002). Many 
prostituted women can report on this continuity in their own experience, since they 
acquired the dissociative skills early on to survive childhood rape and molestation. 
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The necessity of dissociation to psychological survival is a double-edged sword, 
since it undermines a clear perception of one’s current reality; as Moran puts it, 
“the disconnection which is so crucial for maintaining [the prostitute’s] own peace 
of mind is itself a pollutant because it forces her to deny to herself the reality of her 
own experience.... on a psychological level, dissociation is a betrayal of the self” 
(2013, p. 139). 
As Moran’s observation makes clear, this first element is closely related to the 
second: namely, the routine necessity of faking and dissembling in prostitution. 
Making evident one’s real feelings and reactions—which may include boredom, 
disgust, contempt, and/or fear—is manifestly incompatible with pleasing the John 
and may subject one to harm at his hands. One must therefore develop considera-
ble skills of pretense. As D.A. Clarke observes, it is not enough for the prostituted 
woman simply to submit to sexual activity; she is rather expected  
to provide active sexual service to the client on demand. She is further 
expected to provide make-believe at various levels: to pretend that she 
enjoys it, that he is physically impressive and a good lover, that she finds 
him attractive; depending on her rank and place in the sex industry she 
may be required to pretend to be somebody in particular, to act out some 
simple or complex scenario of the client’s choice. The fact is that her job is 
about lying, and lying at the most intimate level. The more intimate the lie, 
the more it costs the liar; and this cost, like so many others in our economy, 
is concealed. (Clarke 1993) 
Here, again, a telling parallel can be drawn between rape and prostitution. It is com-
mon for rapists to force women not only to perform certain acts, but to feign arousal 
and enjoyment, to say that they love it, that it’s the best they’ve ever had, and so 
on. Such coerced performances constitute for victims an especially humiliating and 
traumatizing aspect of the rape. In prostitution, it is all in a day’s work not only to 
have unwanted sex but to feign enjoyment, because that is what the customer 
wants.6 The humiliation of the performance remains, and it becomes yet one more 
aspect of the experience from which to dissociate.  
These two intertwined elements of dissociation and faking often become, over 
time, so ingrained that they begin to take over the woman’s experience even when 
she is not prostituting. For some prostituting women, dissociation becomes so ha-
bitual that they are dissociated—out of it, disengaged, spacey—most if not all of the 
time. One woman describes the result as follows:  
_______________________________ 
6 Johns can engage in truly stunning feats of self-deception with respect to such fakery, and in general 
with respect to the women’s experience of their encounters. For example, one man interviewed by 
Jacquelynne Bailey says, “I suppose I do think of myself as a good lover and I reckon that both of us 
are getting something out of it, not just me. I presume the women here would think that.” Another 
john, who identifies himself as a “submissive,” says that he knows the prostituted woman “wants it, 
because she is dictating the terms . . . I have to do what the woman wants.” Apparently, it has not 
occurred to him that it is he who “[dictates] the terms,” in that he demands that she pretend to dom-
inate him. See Bailey (2002).  
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Soon I just lost track of days at a time . . . . I started feeling invisible. When 
I would come back home from a call, I used to stand in front of a mirror 
and pinch myself to see if I was real. (Williams 1991, cited in Farley 2003) 
A similar sense of alienation and disconnection from the body is evident in the 
comment of another prostituted woman: “I don’t really feel like my body’s alive, I 
think of it more as bruised, as a weight.”7 The depersonalization involved in con-
stantly “acting the part of the thing men want her to be” (as researcher Melissa 
Farley puts it) can result in “the mask [taking] over,” such that it begins to eclipse 
the woman’s original or real personality (Farley 2003, xiii-xiv). As one woman puts 
it, “You become in your own mind what these people do and say with you.”8 
The third experiential element is the stunning pervasiveness of hostility and 
aggression against women in prostitution. While prostituted women are subject to 
insult and violence from various sources, including pimps and police (MacKinnon 
2011, Raphael 2004), my focus here is on their abusive treatment by many Johns. 
As Andrea Dworkin has observed, the prostituted woman is treated not just as an 
object but as a target, an outlet for hostility and dominance (1997, pp. 146-47). 
Women are routinely spat on, called abusive names, and compelled to endure par-
ticularly degrading or painful sex acts. In more extreme but still common cases, 
they are slapped, punched, choked, tied up, kicked, penetrated with dangerous ob-
jects, threatened with weapons, burned with cigarettes, and more. Sometimes a 
woman’s submission to such treatment is, as it were, part of the bargain; the John 
may be willing to pay a high price to subject her to his violent fantasies or degrad-
ing fetishes. Other times, the abuse just happens. One way or another, a woman’s 
experience in prostitution is almost sure to include a number of these hostile en-
counters—to the point that they become normal, rather than surprising or excep-
tional, in the course of her day-to-day life.    
Prostitution is a dangerous, indeed life-threatening, line of work, and it is dan-
gerous in large part because of the aggression and violence of Johns (Moran 2013, 
MacKinnon 2011, Raphael 2004). The aggression sheds further light on the preva-
lence of dissociative strategies: when someone is slapping you and calling you a 
filthy whore, or worse, you need to be able to feel like you are not really there or 
like it is not really you he is talking to. The aggression is also often connected to 
the need to dissemble: the John may require you to act like you love being slapped 
and called a filthy whore, either as part of the bargain or to avoid still worse vio-
lence. 
Not every prostitution encounter is openly hostile and dangerous, of course, 
but the woman never knows whether the next John will be the one who rapes, tor-
tures, or tries to kill her.9 Rachel Moran observes that  
_______________________________ 
7 This is the comment of a French prostituted woman, cited in Jeffreys (1997), p. 221. See also Ekman 
(2013), pp. 90-111, and Coy 2012. 
8 Unpublished interview cited in Farley et. al. (2003), p. 58. 
9 It seems likely that in some cases where no violence is committed, that is precisely because the 
woman—knowing the risks of doing otherwise—has submitted to the Johns’ demands. Rachel Moran 
observes that “the more pliable a woman is, the more she is willing to have her body used and abused 
according to the whims of her client, the less likely she is to encounter physical violence” (2013, p. 
124).  
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if anything is more pervasive than violence itself it is the threat of it . . . For 
every time I was slapped, punched or dragged around by the hair I was 
threatened with those actions, subtly or overtly, countless times. . . . The 
past experience of violence acts as a guarantee of the legitimacy of all pre-
sent and future threats. (2013, p. 123) 
Thus Dworkin, also a survivor of prostitution, describes the experience as follows:  
If you have been in prostitution, you do not have tomorrow in your mind, 
because tomorrow is a very long time away. You cannot assume that you 
will live from minute to minute. . . . If you do, then you are stupid, and to 
be stupid in the world of prostitution is to be hurt, is to be dead. No woman 
who is prostituted can afford to be that stupid, such that she would actually 
believe that tomorrow will come. (1997, p. 139) 
No one can function with that level of fear and threat foremost in her mind all the 
time; thus, we come full circle back around to dissociation. 
I will have more to say later about what gives rise to the extraordinary levels of 
violence and hostility against women in prostitution. For now, I’ll simply note that 
the fear and vigilance with which prostituted women live their daily lives—fear di-
rected largely, with good reason, toward Johns—must exacerbate the unwanted-
ness of the sex acts they endure.  
Given the experiential elements outlined above, it should not be surprising that 
prostitution commonly results in devastating damage to women’s physical and 
emotional health. Such damage includes not only the predictable physical effects 
of violence and STDs, including HIV/AIDS, but also high rates of depression, drug 
addiction, and other serious psychological difficulties (Herman 2003, MacKinnon 
2011). One study of prostituted persons in nine countries, including the U.S., found 
that 68% of the study subjects met the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress 
disorder—a rate similar to that of battered women, rape victims, and survivors of 
state-sponsored torture (Farley et. al. 2003).  
Johns’ Culpability 
At this point, however, we can imagine our John interjecting, “Yes, but is all 
this really my fault? I’m one of the nice ones, after all. I don’t choke or spit on or 
hurl verbal abuse at anyone, and I don’t do anything that she doesn’t consent to. I 
just get what I came for, say thank you, pay the nice lady, and go home.” He might 
protest, in short, that any damage to the prostituted women whom he uses is pri-
marily if not exclusively a result of their openly abusive treatment by other Johns—
as well as by pimps, police, and others—and has nothing to do with him.  
Johns’ response, while understandable, is entirely too hasty. In fact, it only 
makes sense to look to the common structural element of unwanted sex as at least 
one central explanation for the harms of prostitution. To be in prostitution is to 
routinely have sex that one does not want, that one (at least often) finds repellent. 
This fact constitutes the primary occasion for dissociation, and it is worth noting 
_______________________________ 
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that women dissociate from sex acts with all Johns, not only the abusive ones.10 To 
shut down or numb out, presumably, is to employ an act of will to transform one’s 
emotional state from disgust, fear, or hatred to indifference. The unwantedness of 
the sex is also the main reason why women have to fake and dissemble—to pretend 
that they want it even though they don’t. Anyone needing still further evidence of 
unwantedness might consider the fact that prostituted women commonly develop, 
and share with each other, techniques for getting it over with as quickly as possible.  
One study of prostituted women in South Africa found that, although there was 
significantly more violence against women prostituting on the street than in broth-
els, there was no difference in the levels of post-traumatic stress disorder in these 
two different populations (Farley 2004, p. 1100). This finding suggests that it is the 
core experience of prostitution itself—not only, or even primarily, the violence of-
ten associated with it—that produces in women such severe emotional distress.  
The analysis so far suffices to ground a preliminary criticism of Johns’ behav-
ior: no matter how nice and polite he is, he is having sex with someone who almost 
certainly does not want it, and who is having to tie herself in psychological knots 
both to endure it and to fake enjoying it.11 If, as I am suggesting, unwanted sex is 
among the most central and inescapable harms of prostitution, then John is in-
volved in causing that harm to the prostituted women whom he uses for sex. Fur-
thermore, his cheerful willingness to impose sexual activity on someone who does 
not want it displays a deficit of empathy and a grossly inflated sense of sexual en-
titlement.12  
It might be objected here that the behavior of many Johns, even if wrong, is not 
blameworthy because they are unaware of the harm they are doing. After all, the 
typical Johns’ satisfaction in a prostitution encounter depends on a certain “sus-
pension of disbelief” (O’Connell Davidson, 1998, p. 139) wherein he believes that 
she does want the sexual acts she performs; hence the necessity for her to fake en-
joyment. But if he believes this, then why would he see her as being harmed? On 
the contrary, it would seem to him that she is fortunate to be paid for something 
that she also enjoys.  
As the suspended-disbelief descriptor suggests, however, Johns’ belief state is 
not one of simple error but rather of complex and motivated denial. At best, he has 
what Jeffrey Gauthier describes as “a kind of double consciousness in which [he] 
_______________________________ 
10 I base this claim on the fact that, among many first-person accounts of women’s experiences pros-
tituting, I have never seen a woman say or imply that her dissociative practices are limited to encoun-
ters with violent johns. Rather, the dissociation is typically described as a steady state that occurs 
whenever she goes to “work”—and, again, as eventually seeping outside of her “work” life as well. One 
typical example is a woman in massage parlor prostitution who says, “I’ve learned not to be there 
when they touch me. When they touch my breasts I tell myself they’re not really touching me . . . I 
wonder what there is left for me. I wonder where I am.” See Ross, Farley, and Schwarz (2003), p. 207. 
11 Even in the unlikely event that a particular prostituted woman does happen to want it, John has 
no good reason to believe that she does, since her expressions of desire and/or pleasure are likely to 
be indistinguishable from those of the (much more numerous) prostituted women who fake and dis-
semble.   
12 That such attitudes are also revealed in many men’s behavior with their own, non-prostituted part-
ners does not exonerate John, but rather indicates that inflated male entitlement (sexually and oth-
erwise) is unsurprisingly widespread in patriarchal cultures. 
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believes both that the prostitute is acting on the basis of a contractual agreement, 
and that she is driven by some kind of sexual motive” (2011, p. 172). And in fact, 
when Johns volunteer information about their beliefs and desires—as they do in 
online prostitute-user review forums—they frequently complain that a particular 
woman fails to seem interested and enthusiastic.13 That is, while they are irate that 
her performance is not sufficiently convincing, they are nonetheless aware that it 
is just that: a performance. In these cases, then, the level of entitlement reaches a 
new level: the John feels entitled not just to sexually use a woman who does not 
want it, but to have her cater to his fantasies by convincingly faking desire and 
satisfaction.  
Why Is Sex Different? 
So far, I have argued that the unwanted sex of prostitution is harmful, and that 
those who obtain it are culpably involved in causing that harm. Because Johns’ 
sexual use of a prostituted woman is purely optional—he cannot plausibly claim to 
be satisfying a need, or at least not one that cannot be satisfied without harming 
others—his behavior is morally illegitimate.  
We may still be puzzled, however, about why the unwanted sex of prostitu-
tion—unlike many other unwanted but consensual activities, both paid and un-
paid—would have such harmful effects. After all, mere consent suffices to morally 
ratify many activities—or, at least, so we commonly think. The waitress does not 
have to want to bring the customer his coffee; it is enough that she consents to do 
so to earn a paycheck. I do not have to want to grade a stack of papers on Descartes; 
it is enough that I consent to do so as a condition of my getting to do other things 
that I do want to do and to earn a salary. My complaints about the grading not-
withstanding, it is legitimate for my institution to impose this task on me, and do-
ing it does not harm me in any significant way. 
So, as the constant refrain goes in discussions of prostitution: What makes sex 
different? Why isn’t it just another service occupation, another form of wage la-
bor—to which, so long as it is consensual, we either have no moral objection or, at 
least, no more or different such objections than we have to various other forms of 
wage or service labor? And how could the view that it is different be motivated by 
anything other than anti-sex puritanism? 
In my attempt to answer this question, I do not assume that sex is the only 
activity for which mere consent is not enough. It may well be that people should 
not have to take philosophy courses, or serve coffee, or whatever else unless they 
honestly want to. In particular, I do not presume the moral legitimacy of other 
forms of service labor, or of the fact that they are often unwanted. That is, my claim 
is not that sex is, in this respect, in a class by itself—but merely that the class exists 
and that sex belongs to it. 
Some frequently-made observations about why sex is different are true and 
important as far as they go. Sex is very intimate. It penetrates and invades the 
body—at least for women, and sometimes for men. It is close to the center of hu-
_______________________________ 
13 Illustrations of this claim can be found at http://the-invisible-men.tumblr.com/. 
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man personality and self-definition. It has serious repercussions and risks, espe-
cially for fertile women and girls. It is not clear, however, that such answers can 
support the view that mere consent is not enough to morally ratify sexual activity. 
After all, if one is fully informed about the intimacy, risks, and repercussions, and 
one consents anyway—either to have sex for free, or to have it for money—then it 
is not clear what the problem is, or indeed that there is a problem at all. So, what 
else can be said here? Why is sex different such that it belongs to the class of human 
activities that morally ought to be mutually wanted rather than merely consensual?  
To motivate some relevant intuitions, consider the following. Rus Funk, a 
longtime anti-rape educator, reports that when he talks with groups of boys and 
young men about sex, dating, respect, and rape, they are often most interested in 
finding out exactly where the line is separating consent from non-consent: “What 
if she does this or says that—does that count?”14 They want to know, that is, just 
how far they can push things without technically committing rape. While their in-
terest in this question is certainly understandable, the moral standard that it sets 
seems lower than we might wish: they should be interested in finding out not just 
whether their partner is consenting, but whether she wants to be participating. 
Their own desire to continue with sexual activity should be, at least to some degree, 
contingent on their partner’s desire.  
The second kind of case is discussed by Kathleen Trigiani in her critique of 
bestselling self-help author John Gray (of Mars and Venus fame). Trigiani re-
counts Gray’s discussion of one couple, James and Lucy, who (Trigiani goes on)  
were having marital problems because of James’ guilt over his enjoyment 
of quickies . . . . Lucy remained unconvinced because she couldn’t “re-
spond” to quickies. So James told her: “If you are OK with occasional 
quickies, I promise to never expect you to respond. It will just be your gift 
to me. I don’t expect you to get anything out of it. You can lie there like a 
dead log!” (Trigiani 2000) 
The consensual, but unwanted, sexual activity that is recommended here seems to 
me, as it does to Trigiani, a morally ugly spectacle. (That Gray himself celebrates it 
as a successful resolution reveals much about his sexual politics.) Granted, its ug-
liness may be overdetermined; for instance, part of what disturbs here is that 
James does not even want or need for his wife to fake interest. But the core of the 
problem seems to be that, in James’s mind, it simply does not matter whether Lucy 
desires or enjoys the sex. That she consents is enough for him. But should it be?  
Some may be inclined to say that these cases are indeed ugly, but that this is 
precisely because they are non-commercial interactions—that is, they take place in 
relational contexts where we expect people to have consideration for their partners’ 
desires and feelings. In a commercial context, the lack of such concern and any 
sexual or emotional payoff is just what is compensated by a monetary benefit. So, 
we might say, the prostituted woman—unlike poor Lucy—does “get [something] 
out of it”; it is just that what she gets is some financial or other material benefit 
rather than sexual or emotional satisfaction. It will thus be important to explain 
_______________________________ 
14 Rus Funk, personal communication. 
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(as I will shortly) why the commercial context of prostitution exacerbates rather 
than obviating the harms of unwanted sex.  
Even those who share my intuitions in the cases above, and who are willing to 
extend them to prostituted sex, will still be looking for what grounds the intuitions. 
Again, what makes sex different, such that I should want my sexual partner to want 
to have sex with me, whereas it may matter less—or at least not in all the same 
ways—whether the person pouring my coffee or grading my paper wants to do 
that? (Surely there is some difference: unwanted waitressing is no fun, but it sel-
dom results in post-traumatic stress disorder.) I will contend that at least a signif-
icant part of the answer, and one unremarked in many other philosophical discus-
sions of prostitution, lies in the cultural meanings of sex within patriarchy.  
Patriarchy and the Meaning[s] of Sex 
A univocal account of what sex means in a given culture—let alone universally—
is, of course, impossible; sex can and does mean many different things. But sex has 
one familiar and timeworn set of cultural meanings within patriarchy that is 
important to review in this context. According to this set of meanings, to be the 
male or masculine do-er in the act of sexual intercourse is to express dominance, 
ownership, and/or aggression toward the female or feminized do-ee. Allan John-
son puts the point this way: “the patriarchal form of heterosexuality is male-dom-
inated, male-identified, and male-centered. As such, its social significance goes be-
yond sexuality per se, because it also serves as a general model for male dominance 
and for dominance and aggression in general” (1997, p. 150).  
This modeling is painfully evident in many of the ways that we use sexual lan-
guage. We express our sense that we have been harmed or disrespected by saying 
“I’m so screwed,” and the less delicate among us convey hostility and anger by say-
ing “Fuck you!” Less coarse expressions such as “he possessed,” “had,” or “took” 
her also show that we associate sexual intercourse with ownership and dominance. 
Making a sexual overture to someone is often described as “hitting on” the person, 
“blow me” expresses contempt and a desire to subjugate the addressee, and the 
observation that “he made so-and-so his bitch” is understood as a sexualized 
metaphor for his having established his power and dominance over some 
feminized if not female other.  
On this view, sex harms and defiles, elevating one participant’s status in the 
pecking order at the expense of the other participant’s. As Sheila Jeffreys puts it, 
sexual acts in a male-supremacist culture such as ours “confirm and create political 
status” (1997, p. 226). In having sexual intercourse, especially for the first time, a 
man or boy is seen as having gotten or achieved something, a woman or girl as 
having given something up. He has become a man; she has been made a woman. 
The more he does it, the more manly and powerful he is; the more she does it, the 
lower and cheaper she becomes. This sexual double standard is based, at least in 
part, on our cultural assumptions about what sex is and what it does: namely, that 
it is an encounter in which one party conquers and gets the best of the other. He is 
the winner, and thus his status is enhanced by the encounter. She is the loser, the 
one he got a piece of. Thus, again, sex is seen as lowering a woman’s value, making 
her cheap and dirty, while enhancing a man’s power and status.  
Although these are not the only meanings of sex, they are among the culturally 
prominent and shared meanings. I will also suggest shortly that these hostile 
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meanings are among those most likely to be made manifest in the context of pros-
titution. For now, however, this brief account suffices to ground an initial sugges-
tion about why it is that sex—unlike coffee-bringing or philosophy-teaching—
should, in general, be mutually wanted rather than merely consensual. Some com-
plications and exceptions will then follow, the elaboration of which will help move 
us back toward the case of prostitution.  
My basic idea is this: mutual desire is the bare minimum condition that miti-
gates or defuses the hostile cultural meanings of sex discussed above. Ensuring 
mutual desire places a minimal context of safety around this act that is considered 
to—and thus, as a matter of social fact, does—place one party’s human value and 
status in some jeopardy. Coffee-bringing and philosophy-teaching do not require 
such a defusing context—or at least we would need an argument to show that they 
do.15  
This point can help us understand, even if we do not agree with, the concerns 
of those who insist that it is wrong to have sex without love. What may sometimes 
underlie this insistence is the conviction, or at least the suspicion, that only a rela-
tionship of mutual loving regard can truly lift sex out of, or insulate it from, the 
hostile cultural meanings just outlined. A context of ongoing love, intimacy, and 
trust can go some distance toward assuring that what sex means in the culture at 
large is not what it means here, now, between us. It is perhaps not wholly absurd, 
then, to see sex outside this kind of relationship as morally risky.  
Such a relational context can, in fact, ground the kind of exception mentioned 
earlier to the general principle that sex should be mutually desired: cases where 
one member of a relationship has sex out of generosity and desire to please the 
partner. To the extent that we see some such encounters as morally unproblematic, 
it is at least partly because the broader relational context defuses or even supplants 
the unfriendly cultural meanings of sex, thus obviating the need for the occurrent 
mutual desire to defuse those meanings on every single occasion. The relational 
context can succeed, to a significant extent, in altering those meanings—so that the 
thing that one does even though one does not particularly want to do it is signifi-
cantly less dangerous to one’s well-being and integrity than it might be outside of 
this context. In this way, an ongoing relationship with love, trust, and regard can 
float a couple, morally speaking, through the occasional instance of sex without 
mutual desire.16  
_______________________________ 
15 I do not mean to suggest that mutual desire is sufficient to morally ratify sexual activity. In partic-
ular, there can be shared desire for a kind of sex that might plausibly be viewed as degrading or oth-
erwise morally problematic (for instance, sadomasochism). While I cannot fully address these mat-
ters here, I do mean to leave room for the view that sexual activity can be morally wrong even where 
mutually desired.  
16 As suggested earlier, it may not be quite correct to call these cases of “unwanted sex.” It may be 
more felicitous to describe at least some of them as cases where one does want to have sex, not out of 
a desire for one’s own specifically sexual satisfaction, but rather because it is emotionally gratifying 
to please and connect with the partner.  
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Paid For: Exacerbating the Harms of Unwanted Sex 
However, this is never the case in prostitution—indeed, quite the contrary. In 
prostitution, there is no defusing context of love or even mutual respect or affec-
tion.17 The John has bought his way out of any such thing or even its remotest and 
most minimal simulacrum. After all, an essential part of what the John purchases 
in prostitution is a release from most of the interpersonal standards and expecta-
tions that otherwise typically accompany intimate encounters. He buys a sexual 
experience in which he is simply not required to take the other person’s needs, 
desires, or vulnerabilities into account—an experience in which his word is law and 
his desires carry the day. He buys the entitlement to act, on this occasion and with 
this person, as what Julia O’Connell Davidson calls a “despotic subject” (2002, pp. 
90-92).  
Thus, prostitution highlights and exacerbates the most hostile and objectifying 
cultural meanings of sex. Whereas a context of mutual love and regard can defuse 
those hostile meanings, the commercial context of prostitution does just the oppo-
site: it provides an arena in which they get especially free play because they are not 
restrained, compromised, or tamed by ordinary social expectations of even mini-
mal regard or reciprocity. As Anderson and Estes put it, “A man seeks a prostitute 
in order to avoid the inconvenience of sexual relations with another subject . . . 
Prostituted sex . . . delivers a woman-thing without the responsibility of dealing 
with a woman” (1998, p. 155). In this way, commodification ups the ante on the 
harms of unwanted sex.18 Indeed, this analysis helps explain a phenomenon dis-
cussed earlier: namely, the extraordinary level of aggression and violence directed 
at the women by many Johns.19 The commercial context of prostitution unleashes 
the hostile meanings of sexuality while providing an unusually vulnerable and so-
cially approved target for that hostility.  
There is an additional reason why the exchange of money (or other material 
benefits) exacerbates the harms of unwanted sex in prostitution. In her memoir 
and analysis, Rachel Moran emphasizes that the transfer of money functions as a 
mode of silencing:  
what you are actually doing when you prostitute yourself is sanctioning 
and accepting payment for the sexual abuse of your own body. You go 
through all the negative feelings associated with sexual abuse, but in the 
sanctioning of it you have effectively gagged yourself. (2013, p. 107) 
_______________________________ 
17 Granted, a particular John may sincerely express concern for the woman he uses—making sure she 
is comfortable, for instance, or asking after her health and general well-being. The point is that the 
commercial norms of the institution deem any such concern an optional extra, and thus he is likely 
to regard it that way himself: “I’m such a nice guy.”  
18 For fuller accounts of the meanings and effects of commodifying sex, see Anderson (2002) and 
Jyrkinen (2012).  
19 Martin Monto (2004) discusses a study of prostitution customers in which their tendency to con-
ceive of sex as a commodity “was associated with rape myth acceptance, attraction to violent sexual-
ity, and failure to use condoms when with prostitutes. This would seem to suggest that this particular 
orientation toward sexuality . . . may be associated with some of the violence faced by prostitutes” (p. 
174). 
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Moran’s connection to sexual abuse is an apt one, since many child molesters give 
gifts or money to their victims as a way of buying their acquiescence and keeping 
them quiet. In much the same way, Moran says, the payment of women in prosti-
tution functions as “hush money” (p. 112).  
 The silencing function of money exchange in prostitution is exacerbated by 
two ideological currents. The first is the free-market fundamentalism that 
underlies much economic and political discourse in the United States—the 
assumption that, as D.A. Clarke puts it (paraphrasing neoliberal dogma), “The 
Market is the perfect and maximally functional mechanism by which all human 
needs can be met; it is automatically just, fair, and free” (2004, p. 165). On this 
view, all market exchanges are by definition legitimate, and their results are be-
yond criticism; thus, whatever a woman feels was done to her, or taken from her, 
in prostitution, she has no legitimate grounds for complaint. The second ideologi-
cal current has its origin not in capitalism but squarely in patriarchy: the view that 
women who seek or accept money for sex are “whores,” with all that the term im-
plies. The whore, as a character in the patriarchal imagination, is the wrong kind 
of woman to be—dirty, cheap, tainted, worthless, an outcast—and, crucially, she 
deserves whatever she gets. Thus, the money exchange in prostitution silences in-
sofar as it places the female recipient squarely into a category of persons thought 
to be unworthy of concern, justice, or dignity. She knows this as well as anyone else 
does, and so the money exchange of prostitution, as Moran points out, yields 
“shame [as] the psychological cancer of prostitution.” Moran continues,  
The voice of shame that whispers in the ear of some abuse victims: “You 
can’t say you were abused because you got enjoyment from it,” is not dis-
similar to the voice of blame that tells every prostitute: “You can’t say you 
were abused because you got paid for it.” (p. 109) 
Some Connections and Implications 
Before concluding, let me draw out a few implications of my argument. First, 
my analysis may help clarify why some radical feminist critics of prostitution have 
been tempted to elide entirely the distinction between forced and consensual 
prostitution. Both are, and are experienced as, unwanted sex—and both do funda-
mentally rape-like damage to the women involved in them. Furthermore, the fac-
tors undermining women’s apparent consent to prostitution are so punishing, and 
the line between meaningful free consent and its lack so shifting and elusive, that 
it is indeed tempting to throw up one’s hands and call it all forced, or all equally 
forced.20 My analysis also explains, however, why such elision is a mistake. It 
wrongly assumes that prostitution—indeed sex in general—can be gravely wrong 
and harmful only if nonconsensual, and thus obscures from view the significant 
harms of consensual but unwanted sex.21  
_______________________________ 
20 The elision is also due in part to the frequency with which proponents of prostitution contend that, 
while forced prostitution should of course be illegal, “free” or consensual prostitution should be le-
galized, normalized, and viewed as unproblematic. It is understandable that those radical feminists 
who strongly disagree with this strategy (as I do), and who are engaged in active political efforts to 
oppose it, often do so by attacking the “forced versus free” distinction itself.  
21 For an illuminating discussion of these harms, see West (2008). West argues that women who 
engage in consensual but unwanted sex “may sustain real injuries” to their capacities for self-asser-
tion and to their senses of self-possession, autonomy, and integrity. Her comments on the depth and 
nature of these harms seem particularly applicable to prostituted women: “These harms—particularly 
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Second, the analysis herein helps make sense of the common idea that prosti-
tuted women lack self-respect. It reveals as distorted the woman-blaming version 
of this idea that says “she wouldn’t be doing that if she had any self-respect at all,” 
allowing us to understand that the causal arrow goes in the other direction. Pros-
titution is structured as if for the purpose of destroying the self-respect of those 
who do it. The identity and status of the prostituted woman is defined by her 
unconditional susceptibility to an act that is culturally considered to diminish the 
human value of those to whom it is done. Furthermore, surviving the daily de-
mands and material conditions of prostitution—not least the dull and dehumaniz-
ing routine of unwanted sex—requires that she mute and suppress her instincts 
toward self-respect, self-determination, and integrity. Little wonder, then, that the 
levels of serious psychological disturbance among prostituted persons, including 
self-mutilation and suicide attempts, are as high as they are.  
Third and finally, my account suggests that the most fundamental and most 
nearly universal harms of prostitution would not be remedied, and would likely be 
exacerbated, by its legalization. The sex of legal prostitution is, after all, just as 
unwanted and paid-for as the sex of illegal prostitution; thus, we can expect—and 
the research suggests—the same levels of dissociation, dissembling, and so on to 
occur where prostitution is legal as where it is illegal. Furthermore, I think my 
analysis suggests that legalization advocates are mistaken in their frequently-
heard claim that legalization will reduce violence toward prostituted women.22 I 
have argued that the primary reason for the violence of many Johns is the volatile 
context created by the unleashing of the hostile cultural meanings of sex, within a 
commercial setting that is thought to release consumers from many ordinary hu-
man obligations. There is little reason to expect that either of these cultural forces 
will change dramatically anytime soon,23 and certainly, there is no reason to sup-
pose that legalizing prostitution would tame or alleviate them in any way.  
Advocates of legalization often claim that it will help prostituted women by re-
moving the stigma of what they do. If my analysis is correct, however, the stigma, 
or set of attitudes and prejudices, that makes prostitution degrading and danger-
ous is not (or not only) the hatred of prostitutes per se, but rather the contempt for 
women as such that is encoded and expressed in patriarchal hetero-sexuality. The 
_______________________________ 
if multiplied over years or indeed over an entire adulthood—may be quite profound, and they cer-
tainly may be serious enough to outweigh the momentary or day-to-day benefits garnered by each 
individual transaction. Most debilitating, though, is their circular, self-reinforcing character: the 
more thorough the harm—the deeper the injury to self-assertiveness, self-possession, autonomy and 
integrity—the greater the likelihood that the woman involved will indeed not experience these harms 
as harmful, or as painful . . . . that they are not felt as harmful is a consequence of the harm they have 
already caused” (p. 264-265). 
22 My own argument aside, it is worth bearing in mind that the most obvious effect of legalization is 
a dramatic upsurge in prostitution itself. (See Raymond 2013.) A seldom-noted implication of this 
fact is that, even if legalization brought about a modest decrease in the rate of violence in prostitution, 
the manyfold increase in the total number of women prostituting means that overall more women 
are victimized by violence in prostitution (not to mention suffering the other typical harms of prosti-
tution that I’ve discussed here). 
23 For a comprehensive discussion of the connections between free-market consumerist ideology and 
prostitution, and of the failure of both the political right and the political left to apprehend and re-
spond to these connections, see Clarke (2004).  
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stigma of prostitution derives not from its illegality—after all, Johns’ behavior is 
also illegal but is not similarly stigmatized—but rather from the culturally recog-
nized status of the prostituted woman as receptacle and target for sexualized male 
dominance and misogyny. Each act of prostitution—whether legal or not—solidi-
fies the woman’s status as a prostitute, thus deepening the stigma and making her 
more, not less, of a target. Thus, as Sheila Jeffreys puts it, “Prostitution cannot be 
saved . . . by removing the stigma, when it is precisely the attitudes identified as 
‘stigma’ that create the phenomenon of prostitution in the first place” (1997, pp. 
240-41). Fortuitously, this point also helps us articulate a further moral criticism 
of the John: in using a prostituted woman—whether legally or illegally, and 
whether or not he is gentle and polite—he both exploits and deepens her degraded 
status. 
If the preceding conjectures are right, then legalization serves only to place a 
cloak of legitimacy around the devastating harms that I have argued are intrinsic 
to prostitution as we know it. In fact, as mentioned earlier, my analysis may offer 
some implicit support for the so-called Nordic model of legislation, which crimi-
nalizes the pimp and the buyer, but not the seller, in prostitution.24 My account 
moves us in this direction, at least, by showing that Johns are wrongfully harming 
the women from whom they buy sexual service.  
Conclusion 
The view that prostitution is just a job like any other job depends for its surface 
plausibility not only on considerable naiveté about the conditions of life for most 
prostituted persons, but also on a convenient forgetfulness about some of the most 
central and familiar meanings of sex in our patriarchal culture. Given those mean-
ings, it is morally important across many contexts for sex to be mutually desired, 
rather than merely consensual. Furthermore, the typical harms of unwanted sex 
are greatly amplified when the right to impose such sex on another person is 
thought to have been bought and paid for.  
Prostitution tells many lies. But it tells important, if uncomfortable, truths 
about sex in our culture. The combustible power of these truths, combined with 
our resistance to examining them, explains why prostitution is both celebrated and 
_______________________________ 
24 Advocates of legalization frequently claim that legalization is necessary to enable prostituted 
women to report acts of violence against them. Such claims ignore the Nordic model option (origi-
nating in a 1999 Swedish law): decriminalizing the women while keeping and enforcing laws against 
pimps and johns, thus penalizing those who are harming others rather than those being harmed. In 
this way, advocates of legalization encourage the invalid inference that, in order to stop criminalizing 
vulnerable people who have enough problems as it is, we must also treat pimps as legitimate employ-
ers and johns as legitimate consumers. For a full account of the Swedish law, its justification, and its 
consequences, see Ekberg (2004). 
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vilified, both publicized and hidden away, both institutionalized and pushed un-
derground. The particular brutality of these truths as they are made manifest in 
prostitution helps explain the growing global strength of movements for prostitu-
tion abolition.  
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